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CIVILITY, DEMOCRACY, AND NATIONAL POLITICS
MARY E. STUCKEY AND SEAN PATRICK O’ROURKE
This essay considers questions about civility raised in the discourse respond-
ing to the January 2011 shootings in Tucson, Arizona. Focusing on two sites of
discord—the debate in the media and President Obama’s address at the
memorial service for the victims—our analysis identifıes two conceptions of
civility and their corresponding assumptions about democracy and commu-
nity, provides a critique of both conceptions, and offers a conceptual frame-
work for rhetorical critics studying civility.
Theproblem of “civility,” which has come to occupy so much of thepublic conversation about the contemporary nature and limits ofdemocratic forms of discussion and debate, is, at root, the problem
of democratic community.1 But there seems to be considerable slippage
between practices that may be understood as civil and the practices associ-
atedwith a robust democracy.2 This has been an issue historically, of course,
but it has also gained currency as concerns over electronic communication,
globalization, and intercultural communication have implicated questions
of appropriately civil modes of communication in the news and online,3
between individuals,4 and among cultures.5 The scholarship reveals both
the ways in which “community” has become a broad and analytically rather
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imprecise concept and also the ways in which the idea of civility permeates
that concept. Our essay endeavors to bring some analytic clarity to the idea
of civility, to think about the ways it helps and hinders our understanding of
political community, and to offer a conceptual framework for rhetorical
critics working on the problem. Specifıcally, we argue that the conceptions
of civility that emerged from the discourse surrounding the January 2011
Tucson shootings offer rhetorical critics relatively thin accounts of civility,
and we offer a propaedeutic set of considerations that may serve to thicken
future investigations of the problems associated with analyzing political
discourse and its various relationships to democratic governance.
DISCOURSE AND DEMOCRACY
Most obviously, rhetoric, community, and civility are united in the idea that
“good rhetoric” requires “good faith,”6 and that such rhetoric somehow
involves the avoidance ofwillful deception and the readiness to speak and to
listen with respect—whatWilson CareyMcWilliams called “civic dignity.”7
Political participation is at the root of civic dignity, for McWilliams’s
concept of democracy depends upon both active involvement and genuine
communication. For McWilliams, civic dignity is also not possible without
religious belief, because humans require the transcendent to embrace the
vernacular, and public life should elevate private life, not degrade it.8 Perfect
good faith is never attainable, but it is a standard toward which all commu-
nities should reach.
McWilliams’s contributions are useful because his understanding of
community is widely shared; there is something appealing in the idea that
political communities exist to elevate the human soul rather than merely to
advance human interests (as the early contract theorists would have it).9
Walt Whitman waxed eloquent on this subject, writing that “the genuine
union, when we come to a mortal crisis, is, and is to be, after all, neither the
written law, nor, (as is generally supposed,) either self-interest, or common
pecuniary or material objects—but the fervid and tremendous IDEA, melt-
ing everything else with resistless heat, and solving all lesser and defınite
distinctions in vast, indefınite, spiritual, emotional power.”10 Whitman
argued here that some transcendent value lies at the heart of political
community and that value has the power to erase distinctions. For Whit-
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man, individualism is the foundation of a democracy; but individuals need
a unifyingmechanism, andWhitman, likeMcWilliams, found it in religion.
“Religion,” however, is not so easily parsed and not so helpful a source of
civic unity in modern times as it might have been for Whitman. In today’s
secular state, the use of religion as a warrant for political action is fraught
with diffıculties and creates far more problems than it solves. So the core
problem remains: if political community is to be driven by more than mere
selfısh interest, it is critical to fınd a ground upon which such community
can be founded. The problem of contemporary democracy can thus be
understood as the problem of creating democratic community in the ab-
sence of a widely shared, authorizing transcendent value.
As Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca noted, discourse iden-
tifıes, promulgates, and adjudicates values; discourse is therefore funda-
mental to the creation and maintenance of political communities.11
Argument is both the means and the ends of such discourse, for it fosters a
sense of solidarity among those who share these values, and thus fosters
community. “That is to say,” Richard Graff andWendyWinn have argued,
“human communities are constituted and defıned by the values around and
through which they commune; and they are sustained through public
discourse in which adherence to these values is reinforced and, also,
through the public argumentation inwhich these values are deployed or put
to the test.”12 Communal speech provides and sustains the transcendent
values upon which community depends. Discourse thus lies at the heart of
community, and the ways in which people understand “civil” discourse can
tell us a great deal about their understanding of community.13
Two distinct ways of conceptualizing this relationship between civility
and community emerge from the debate over the January 2011 shootings in
Tucson, Arizona. The fırst, “civility as manners,” can be foundmost clearly
in the fırst set of texts we studied: the media commentary on the shootings
and the claims and counterclaims that followed. A reliance on “civility as
manners” is the thinnest, most impoverished, and least helpful way of
thinking about this relationship. In it, civility is reduced to its narrowest
dimensions, limited to the tolerance of differing points of view. What is
most important in this approach is that all communications arrive garbed in
a veneer of care and concern and in conformity to the reigning standards of
conversational taste and etiquette. It is, in fact, often a distraction from real
problems, a mode of silencing, and a potentially exclusionary understand-
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ing of community as the province of the privileged. It relies on an ideology
of politeness and a conversational or invitational rhetoric.14
A quite different way of understanding the relationship, “civility as
political friendship,” can be found in the second text we studied: President
Obama’s speech following the shootings.15 The speech presents a richer
conception of civility—one that holds out the idea of political friendship,
which in turn relies on the principles of respect and charity. For Obama,
respect is understood as a replacement for the thin notion of tolerance, and
charity is a stance that attributes benign motives to all interlocutors.16 The
“political friendship” approach ismore inclusive than “civility asmanners,”
depends on ideas related to reconciliation (and even of integration and
reintegration), and is rooted in civic republicanism. It embraces a contro-
versial or agonistic rhetoric.
We argue, however, that neither “civility as manners” nor “civility as
political friendship” offers rhetorical critics complete or even very useful
ways of interrogating different understandings of civility and their relation-
ships to public discourse and democracy. We offer, therefore, a set of
considerations that eschews an understanding of civility as manners but
also goes further than political friendship. It is grounded in a concept of
community that is more genuinely inclusive, centers on incorporation
rather than integration, and is rooted in a kind of radical democracy that
allows for and even celebrates robust, passionate rhetoric and a correspond-
ingly broader array of “acceptable” discursive forms (including humor,
argument, invective, and a variety of other styles thatmay be conventionally
considered “uncivil”). It assumes the benefıts of political friendship, but
through an awareness of the inevitability of political conflict focuses its
attention on higher-order values such as truth telling, inclusion, and the
determined advocacy of unpopular positions. This heuristic offers analysts
a way of considering the relationships between discourse and democracy
without having to rely on the aforementioned notions of civility as deter-
minative of good democratic practice.
CIVILITY AS MANNERS AND THE POLITE RHETORIC OF CONVERSATION
The thinnest understanding of political community rests on the assump-
tion, associated by some with the classical liberal tradition, that democratic
argument at its best is rational; straightforward; directed at an educated,
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attentive civic populace; and polite.17 In this understanding of democracy,
deliberative public discourse in established venues has the central place in
the public sphere, and such discourse should be based in reason. Emotion is
regarded as suspicious, and the public is rightly wary of politicians who rely
on appeals to either character or pathos. In this conception of democratic
culture, politeness is an importantmanifestation of tolerance.18 Differences
are understood as inherent to the human condition and as irremediable, so
the goal is not to reconcile difference so much as to manage or buffer it.19
Democratic citizens thus confıne debate to issue content; delving into the
deeper areas of difference creates unmanageable tension. The operative
metaphor or standard is that of polite conversation.20
In their frenzied discussion of theTucson shootings, themedia in general
relied heavily upon this thin understanding of discourse, democratic polit-
ical culture, and the relationship between them. This coverage featured
three main themes: the media blamed rhetoric for the shooting, under-
standing the shooter’s behavior as an all-but-inevitable reaction to over-
heated partisanship; there were minor attempts to offer alternative frames
and to historicize the incident, tomake an argument that the root cause was
not discourse, but something else; and therewas amarked lack of trust in the
American mass public.
First, the media announced that the Tucson shootings were best under-
stood as a failure of discourse.21 Thane Burnett of the Toronto Sun analyzed
American media coverage this way: “Just as guilty [as the alleged shooter],
read a decision by pundits and even a sheriff involved in the Arizona
political assassination attempt, were the enflamed words of others—a cli-
mate of ramped-up rhetoric across America.”22 Similarly, Jason Horowitz
and Lisa DeMoraes of the Washington Post noted that Keith Olbermann
had immediately announced that Sarah Palin’s rhetoric was to blame,
“saying that if she did not ‘repudiate her own part, however tangential, in
amplifying violence and violent imagery in American politics, she must be
dismissed from politics.’”23 AriannaHuffıngton seemed to agree, writing in
an email quoted in the same story, “It’s the demonization that is the
problem, not the liveliness.”24 In a sort of “monkey see, monkey do”
understanding of politics, these claims comedown to arguing that if citizens
hear violent rhetoric, they are forced to act or react violently—adults in a
democracy are apparently unable to distinguish metaphors and respond
appropriately to them.25 Language, ever dangerous, must be policed. This
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was not the only option for making sense of the shootings, nor was it the
only one used; it was, however, the dominant feature of media coverage.
Occasionally, other frames surfaced. As portrayed in Burnett’s story, for
instance, the shooting could be understood as a “political assassination
attempt” rather than a failure of discourse.26 The emotional valences of this
frame were quite different from those of the “discourse made him do
it” frame. Instead of locating the cause in the political climate, the assassi-
nation frame—without necessarily blaming the victim—would have it lo-
cated in the person or the policies (whether those related to health care or to
another issue) of the intended victim, Representative Giffords. The empha-
sis would have been on the substance of political decision making, not on
the climate in which decision making occurred.27 The relative rarity of that
frame meant that Giffords, as a unique political actor with specifıc and
clearly articulated policy preferences, was reduced to a symbol of the failure
of discourse.
There were other possible competing frames. Issue frames were avail-
able: gun control legislation and the lack thereof, or the failures of the public
health system that perhaps allowed a mentally ill individual out on the
streets. Terrorist frames were available: the media could have emphasized a
lack of security in public places. These frames showed up intermittently but
were drowned out by reliance on the “public culture did it” frame. Yet
despite “no evidence [having] emerged to suggest that Mr. Loughner was
motivated by a particular political ideology or was influenced by the highly
charged political atmosphere prevalent in Arizona and the rest of the
country,” frames emphasizing political controversy and heated rhetoric
dominated coverage of the shootings.28
Burnett noted that “the push for reflection and less fınger-pointing has
caused a rush to pointmore fıngers.”29 That is, the failure of discourse is also
a partisan failure, and rather than attempting to correct the former, the
incident merely provided ammunition for criticizing the latter. A number
of commentators focused on the fact that, rather than the tragedy shocking
the nation’s leaders into altering their behavior in a spirit of unity, these
leaders were instead using the incident as a way of gaining partisan advan-
tage.30 Peter Wallsten, for instance, wrote that “Rush Limbaugh accused
Democrats of ‘rubbing their hands together’ in anticipation of using the
shootings as a political revitalization.”31 Wallsten then underlined the par-
tisanship of the Pima County sheriff’s remarks in the aftermath of the
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shooting. This sort of coverage emphasized the contentious nature of con-
temporary politics and attempted to implicate both sides of the partisan
divide in that conflict.32
Such treatment is, of course, consistent with the media’s commitment to
“objective” and “balanced” reporting, and it has all the faults of that report-
ing. In an attempt to assume a neutral position, the media were either
unable or unwilling to make good judgments about the quality or merit of
the arguments and positions they reported.Not all issues are cleanly divided
into two equal and competing sides; many issues have more than two sides,
and sometimes one side behaves less well than another, for any number of
possible reasons. The political world is complicated, and as legions of
scholars have pointed out, so-called objective reporting can often result in
political distortion.33 Nonetheless, the media were committed to such cov-
erage and blamed both Republicans andDemocrats for the political climate
that they depicted as the root of the shootings.
Interestingly, a subframe of partisanship emerged: a “blame the media”
frame. Here, for example, Representative Peter T. King (R-NY) was quoted
as saying that, “basically, large parts of the media are driven by oversimpli-
fıcation and confrontation,” which in turn contributed to the political
culture that created the shooting.34 Locating the blame both within the
political system and in the institution that covers that system, King argued
that the public culture has been poisoned by the actions of political fıgures
and a mass media that thrives on conflict.35 In a world that privileges
conflict, violence is predictable.
The media also sought to fınd other explanations for the shooting and
relied heavily on academic sources as warrants for that endeavor. Martin J.
Medhurst, for instance, was quoted along with Larry Sabato and Kathleen
Hall Jamieson;Medhurst and Jamieson, in particular, argued thatAmerican
political culture has often featured displays of vitriol and that today’s
rhetoric simply reflects intense public emotions, as has been the case in
other eras.36 This attempt at contextualizing contemporary discourse
would seem to have logically led to the conclusion that if discourse has often
been contentious in the past, then we have nothing to fear from such
discourse now, but it curiously did not. Instead, themedia loudly trumpeted
the claim that partisanship had created a negative political climate and that
the shootings were the predictable, if not the inevitable, result. This, they
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implied, was what happened to a nation that crossed the borders of
politeness.
The dominant media frame centered on the importance of the disputa-
tious political culture, which members of both parties, and potentially even
the media themselves, had helped create. This culture, which relied on
metaphors of guns and violence, was directly implicated in the Tucson
shootings. Other frames were available—there could have been a mental
health frame, a gun control frame, or a variety of other options. That the
media relied on the “culture of invective” frame indicates both the preva-
lence of this frame in the words of the political actors they interviewed and
their understanding of the relationship between discourse and political
community.
Community is only possible, in this understanding of civility, if polite-
ness reigns and if social niceties are observed. Citizens cannot be trusted to
understand metaphoric language or to respond to that language appropri-
ately; we are all on the verge of mental illness and can only be exposed to a
very narrow range of discursive options.37Disagreements cannot be aired in
public, because to do so would endanger the fragile consensus of the
national polity and threaten the tenuous hold we have on tolerance for one
another’s differences. In this understanding of politics, a congressman
shouting, “You lie!” at the president, the use of a “targeting” metaphor to
describe a campaign strategy, and an actual loaded weapon in the hands of
a deranged citizen become functional equivalents. An editorial in USA
Today, for example, commented that the “tragedy in Arizona was unspeak-
able,” yet also made a sort of sense, especially in the context of the United
States’ long history of violence: “Combine that [violent national] past with
today’s overheated political rhetoric and easy access to high-poweredweap-
onry, and perhaps the only question was when, and where, the next un-
speakable act would occur.”38 Metaphor, it seems, may be even more
dangerous than rhetoricians realize.
Civility understood as politeness has many problems. First, civility used
in this way can be used as a silencing mechanism. If politeness is the
standard, arguments—and those who make them—can be dismissed as
being “uncivil,” regardless of their merits. This is especially worrying when
this tactic is employed against the marginalized by those with political
power.39 Not only do the powerless often have to resort to conventionally
uncivil arguments tomake their case, and not only are the conditions under
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which they aremarginalized often frustrating or even enraging, but the very
act of disciplining that anger can be understood as a further act of repres-
sion, if not violence.40 When civility is wielded in this way, the behavior of
those who challenge the existing order becomes the issue, and the injustice
motivating the conduct is rendered inconsequential. When civility func-
tions as a distraction from real issues, it is a mask, not a means toward an
authentic democracy.41 It is not exactly a surprise that this is the way the
mass media tend to understand civility. On the other hand, President
Obama—whomade civility a centerpiece of his 2008 campaign—offered in
his response to the Giffords shooting a more nuanced understanding of the
relationship between public discourse, civility, and democracy.
CIVILITY AS POLITICAL FRIENDSHIP AND THE AGONISTIC RHETORIC OF
CONTROVERSY
At fırst glance, Barack Obama’s rhetoric on civility may seem to be “invita-
tional” in that it is intended to foster a dialogic form of communication that
allows interlocutors to be more fully ethical in their approach to communi-
cating differences.42 And while Obama seems to conceive of the public
forum as a place where such rhetoric would be both welcome and produc-
tive, and many of his efforts to “change the culture in Washington” (as he
put it during his campaign) valorize this kind of public speech, his rhetoric
on civility is best understood, we believe, as “controversial” or “agonistic.”43
Rooted in civic republicanism, controversial rhetoric assumes a broad array
of difference between and among people and makes the creation of “polit-
ical friendship”44 the key struggle in public controversy.45
In this understanding, as Patricia Roberts-Miller reminds us, public
disputation involves conflict because thinking itself is conflictual; people
argue with one another to hone their mutual understanding, not merely to
win, and public advocacy is more about “the play of difference” than it is
about persuasion.46 Indeed, Obama’s entire speech at the memorial service
for the victims of the Tucson shooting can be read as a defense of his
understanding of democracy as struggle. There are four key moves in the
speech: the claim to national unity based on shared values; the defınition of
democracy as the exercise of rights; the implicit claim that, because the
nation is a family, relationships among citizens are best understood as based
on sacrifıce and service; and the claim that enacting those relationships is
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heroic and results in a particular kind of civic culture. For Obama, a certain
kind of discourse is required to bring this culture into being.
He begins the speech predictably enoughwith the claim that the nation is
unifıed and that he, as president, represents that unity: “I have come here
tonight,” he said, “as an American who, like all Americans, kneels to pray
with you today and will stand by you tomorrow.” Obama here depicts
himself synecdochically as an embodiment of the nation, which is humble
and proud, reverent and unifıed. His actions become consubstantial with
those of the nation; he and the country both pray and stand with the people
most directly affected by the Tucson shootings.
He then recites the events that led up to those shootings: “On Saturday
morning, Gabby, her staff, and many of her constituents gathered outside a
supermarket to exercise their right to peaceful assembly and free speech.”
They were, in other words, acting symbolically as Americans, for they were
exercising their rights in what Obama defıned as a “quintessentially Amer-
ican scene.” In this rendering, the individuals become subordinated to the
scene: it is not just individual Americanswhowere imperiled, butAmerican
democracy.47 Obama similarly places emphasis on scene rather than actor,
in one of his few, brief references to Giffords’s assailant, stating, “That was
the scene that was shattered by a gunman’s bullets.” He reinforces this focus
on scene by describing each victim in terms of her or his contribution to
democracy: he highlighted, for example, a judge who was particularly hard
working, a woman who was notable for her volunteer activities, and—
perhaps most tellingly, in the context of our analysis—a husband who had
always made a habit of “helping folks” and whose “fınal act of selflessness
was to dive on top of his wife, sacrifıcing his life for hers.”
In presidential eulogies, the president generally remarks on traits in the
person being memorialized that typify his understanding of citizenship in
general.48 For Obama, then, the primary element of citizenship in his polity
is a spirit of selflessness and sacrifıce—a dedication to the common rather
than the private good. And the nation, wounded by the gunman’s bullets,
has cause to mourn yet also has cause to hope, for not only was this spirit
exemplifıed in the various citizens gathered in Tucson that morning but, as
the president inserted into his prepared remarks, “a fewminutes afterwe left
her room . . . Gabby opened her eyes for the fırst time.” It is interesting that
Obamamoved directly from a recounting of sacrifıce to the announcement
that the congresswoman “opened her eyes,” for the speech reads as if the
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latter event were a direct consequence of the former: the nation’s sacrifıce
has led to an awakening, an ability to see.
The fırst things that Gabby sees in Obama’s narrative are citizen/heroes:
the aide whoministered to his boss and the people who tackled the gunman
before he could reload. The lesson that is made available to us through
Gabby’s sight is that “heroism is here, in the hearts of so many of our fellow
citizens, all around us, just waiting to be summoned.” For Obama, then,
heroism is a quality of the heart and will, and it is revealed in times of
distress and, more importantly, in everyday discourse.
The president moves immediately from valorizing the heroic actions of
the morning of the shooting to the culture that, he implies, produced the
conditions that made the shooting possible: “But at a time when our dis-
course has become so sharply polarized, at a time when we are far too eager
to lay the blame for all that ails the world at the feet of those who happen to
think differently thanwe do, it’s important for us to pause for amoment and
make sure that we’re talkingwith each other in a way that heals, not in a way
that wounds.” Note how the motive in the fırst part of this quotation is
located in the scene rather than the actors: discourse is “sharply polarized”
and theworld is ailing. The actual individualsmatter only after the scene has
been established and differences that exist at the national level have been
reduced to trivialities. Opposing sides in the national debate just “happen to
think differently,” and themistake peoplemake is being “too eager to lay the
blame for” the nation’s ills. But with Gabby’s eyes now open, the nation can
see a better way—a better community through better discourse—and we
can learn to speak not to but “with each other in a way that heals, not in a
way that wounds.” Words become identifıed with bullets; discourse that
wounded became actual weapons.
In one sense, it would have been easy for Obama to lay the blame for the
shooting on one side or the other in the political debate—to state, as so
many in themedia did, that the “targeting” discourse used bymany Repub-
licans was, indirectly or directly, the cause of the shooting. He refuses to do
that and instead says, “For the truth is, none of us can know exactly what
triggered this vicious attack.” The nation was assaulted, and the causes are
obscure; they are beyond the national knowing, out of Gabby’s sight. It is
not important that we affıx blame so much as it is important that we “be
willing to challenge old assumptions in order to lessen the prospects of such
violence in the future.” The nation has to be willing to see with Gabby’s eyes
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and to make changes in national behavior and national discourse to bring
about a more peaceful world: the world of heroes that lives in all of our
hearts.
“But what we cannot do,” Obama continued, “is use this tragedy as one
more occasion to turn on each other.” Our responsibility as citizens, he
argued, is to shield one another, to act with selflessness, and to create a
national community out of a specifıc kind of national discourse. That
discourse must be based on “a good dose of humility” and on a recognition
that we are a national family—“an American family 300 million strong”—
with relations characterized by empathy and a willingness to “expand our
moral imaginations.” The nation, thus constituted as a family, no longer
sees out of Gabby’s eyes but rather turns to seeGabby herself: “InGabby, we
see a reflection of our public-spiritedness, that desire to participate in that
sometimes frustrating, sometimes contentious, but always necessary and
never-ending process to form a more perfect Union.” Here Obama makes
the basic level of American citizenship clear: to be an American is to be
willing to join with others to improve the nation. Citizenship is inherently
participatory and inclusive. Good citizens contend with others to improve
the national experience for everyone.
For Obama, the promise of this vision is personifıed by Christina-Taylor
Green, who exemplifıes “all of our children, so curious, so trusting, so
energetic, so full of magic, so deserving of our love, and so deserving of our
good example.” Obama conflates the public (Gabby) with the private
(Christina-Taylor) to produce a civic family, united in an America “as good
as Christina imagined it.” Because we are able to see with Gabby’s eyes and
tap into Christina-Taylor’s imagination, the nation can return to a more
innocent time and create a democracy that “lives up to our children’s
expectations.” This process begins, for Obama, with a willingness to change
both the kind of discourse we engage in and also the spirit motivating that
discourse.
Throughout the speech, Obama is careful not to lay blame or to make
overtly partisan arguments. Implicitly, however, the speech is clearly a call
to “change the culture in Washington” and in the rest of the nation.49 He
understands the civic culture to be based in and reflected by the national
discourse. By changing the discourse, he argues, we can change the nation.
Thus, rather than offering a discourse of accusation in response to the
Tucson tragedy, he instead offers a vision of an alternative, a national
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conversation rather than a national argument. In privileging conversation,
Obama implicitly argues that the purpose of politics is communal. Through
Gabby’s eyes he sees a nation that has been divided by combative and
contentious politics in which the goal is the destruction of one’s opponents
and in which words become the equivalent of bullets. That nation, crippled
by this kind of discourse, still retains heroic potential; it can, through its
inherent spirit of selflessness and sacrifıce, become a nation dedicated to
Christina-Taylor’s imagined political community, in which reciprocity and
mutuality are privileged above narrow political concerns.
Vision is the dominant metaphor in Obama’s address, but the mecha-
nism for political change, as he characterizes it, is clearly political talk. For
Obama, as for the national media, the connection between political com-
munity and political discourse is strong and self-evident. While Obama
accounts for more complexity and nuance in this relationship than do the
media, he fails to consider that all sides have to be willing to participate in
this polity for it to be enacted; motive inheres not only to scene but to actors
as well. Furthermore, his version of controversial rhetoric is limited in the
same ways that other versions are: it ignores power differentials, constrains
the forms political protest might take, and assumes commonality of interest
where there might in fact be none. He provides a comforting interpretation
of political community, but it is not as robust as it might be, and the vision
of democratic discourse he relies on offers little analytic leverage for critics
endeavoring to locate the connections between forms of discourse and the
enactment of particular kinds of political communities.
CIVILITY AS POLITICAL COMMUNITY AND THE DEMOCRATIC RHETORIC
OF PROTEST AND REFORM
Aswe noted at the outset, the issue of civility has come to dominatemuch of
our public debate over the last few years and, particularly in the aftermath of
the Arizona shootings, rhetorical and political theorists have struggled with
the various problems it entails. Thomas W. Benson notes that, as radically
situated communicative practices, civility and incivility are inherently re-
sistant to rule-based solutions.50 Acknowledging this fact, Jeffrey B. Kurtz
suggests that “a new rhetorical courage, and a corresponding rhetorical
imagination, is needed to navigate the times in which we live.”51
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Perhaps the best way to imagine a place for civility in democratic com-
munity is to consider the best case against it. In “The Violence of Civility,”
Dana L. Cloud contends that “the imposition of a norm or expectation of
civility onto groups previously denied entry into the civil spaces of democ-
racy is a form of oppressive social discipline”;52 she concludes that, “to be
faithful to the interests of ordinary people, we will have to give up the
precious bauble of civility into which we have invested our hope for democ-
racy.”53 Along the way, Cloud argues that civility is an ideology of imperi-
alism, women’s oppression, and the democratic state that functions as a
reflexive response to exposure to unequal power relations and, as such,
becomes a god term of liberalism.54 Cloud limits her critique, however
slightly, to instances in which civility is invoked across class divides and
against movements; she also notes in closing, seemingly in at least partial
agreement with Benson, that civility is entirely inappropriate in specifıed
instances and under certain conditions.55
In many ways, Cloud’s assessment is in line with our analysis of the
rhetoric surrounding the Arizona shootings and the corresponding calls for
civility: conceptions of civility oriented toward manners or political friend-
ship promote rhetorical norms of politeness and controversy that routinely
ignore disparities of power and conditions of inequality, in part because
they assume commonality of interest, a range of fair-minded motives,
co-equal willingness to participate in open deliberation and decision mak-
ing, and roughly equivalent access to communication media. While no
approach to democratic community that recognizes the severity of these
deeply embedded problems can at the same time fully resuscitate a useful
sense of civility, there yet remains the promise of a civility with eyes wide
open—perhaps more a hope than a reality—that reveals itself in consider-
ation of fıve facets of the problem: others, struggle, discomfort and sacrifıce,
means, and solidarity.
OTHERS
In his essay “Heracles’ Bow: Persuasion and Community in Sophocles’
Philoctetes,” JamesBoydWhite offers away to understandpolitical relations
by asking the question, “What does it actually mean . . . to treat another
person as a ‘means’ to an end, or, by contrast, as an ‘end in himself’?”56
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Alternatively, as Scott Welsh recently framed the issue, what does it mean
“to treat others as objects to bemoved rather than as people with whom one
might reason”?57 By exploring the story of Philoctetes, Odysseus, and
Neoptolemus, White accesses different conceptions of human relations. In
one, community is the product of shared interest, and so long as there are
instrumental reasons for common action, such action will occur. In an-
other, community is the product of shared history, language, and culture;
participation in shared emotions in response to that shared history; and “the
offer and acceptance of a trust.”58 Such a community is grounded in a
shared ethotic experience, based on individual integration into a larger
whole. In the third conceptualization White investigates, community is
based on incorporation; communion, also understood as reconciliation, is
achieved by locating a shared understanding of cause (rather than blame).
“Where this leaves us,” White writes, “is with the enforced recognition of
certain central ethical and practical truths: that there is no sure-fıre method
of attaining your ends when those ends require the cooperation of others
and that to recognize the freedom and autonomy of another, which is the
only real possibility if one is to succeed at all, is necessarily to leave room for
the exercise of that freedom and autonomy inways you do not wish.”59 Real
community, White argues, is the same as forgiveness. Politically as well as
interpersonally, this means that community is based on empathy, on an
insistence that the humanity of others be recognized as before all else.60 So
for the rhetorical critic seeking to assess how discourse structures political
community, a focus on the ways in which the given discourse constructs
others, and the relationships among and between individuals, is an impor-
tant consideration.
STRUGGLE
Less poetically, Chantal Mouffe has suggested that civility is best under-
stood as a struggle.61 Her notion of community is a rich one, in which
participants rely on mutual understanding attained through, among other
things, the telling of shared stories. Importantly, these stories emphasize
cause rather than blame and allow for, or even depend upon, controversial
rhetoric. Moreover, her envisioned community entails people being edu-
cated enough to require a rhetoric that provides good reasons (understood
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as having both narrative rationality and fıdelity), includes normative com-
ponents, and is not restricted to or dependent on a merely instrumental
rationalism. This kind of political community would be diffıcult and un-
comfortable, but it might result in a more authentic incorporation. Such a
vision is not unique to Mouffe, but it does indicate that the idea of struggle,
and the terms uponwhich political discourse organizes such struggle, ought
be central to a discussion of rhetoric and political community.62 Discourse
that denies the legitimacy of struggle or that makes it amenable only to
violent resolution is different than discourse that acknowledges, accepts,
and works within a logic of struggle and contention.
DISCOMFORT AND SACRIFICE
We do not often conceptualize “community” as a site of discomfort, yet
political community demands that we “maximize agreement while also
attending to its dissonant remainders: disagreement, disappointment, re-
sentment, and all the other byproducts of political loss.”63 The expression of
such loss may not always be polite or conventionally civil, but it is funda-
mental to the preservation of democratic community. Ultimately, Danielle
S. Allen advocates a still more demanding form of political community,
which “cultivates a habitual expertise” in “sacrifıce.”64 She fınds sacrifıce
necessary for the development of “suppler means” of political accommoda-
tion—means that go beyondmere “reciprocity” and allow for the investiga-
tion of what exactly is required, in any given circumstance, for social
justice.65 She recognizes that this kind of political community is, like the
original polis, both complete and aspirational: it includes all citizens, but
such a community is inherently unstable, always in the process of becoming.
For the critic, parsing out the ways in which a discourse might require or
resist sacrifıce—and noting which members of the polity are expected to
make sacrifıces—is therefore key to evaluating the rhetorical structure of a
political community.
MEANS
Part of the discomfort of democracy is that inequality often requires those
with less power or fewer resources to resort to rhetorical means that are all
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too open to charges of “incivility.” The grape and lettuce boycotts of the
United Farm Workers, the sit-ins and freedom rides of the civil rights
movement, the occupation of unused federal land by Native American
activists, the burning of draft cards and the coarse declarations about what
to do with the Selective Service Act by antiwar demonstrators, and the
burning of American flags were all rhetorical acts of incivility. And yet
democratic citizenship requires that we recognize the important role that
such tactics play. Just as invective and insult may serve valuable deliberative
purposes, so too can acts of civil disobedience and directed vulgarity.66
Political discourses grant varying degrees of legitimacy to such tactics; the
degree to which a given system is open to these types of rhetoric may be an
indicator of the strength of that system’s commitment to certain under-
standings of democracy.
SOLIDARITY
AsWhitman noted, if democracy is to work, democratic citizens must fınd
a way to exalt the individual and form community. Whitman looked to
religion and the arts for the glue that would bind Americans;67 others fınd
this sort of glue in a rich concept of “solidarity,” which does not require
fraternity and is legal, not familial, in its origins (which go back toAristotle’s
philia).68 Philia, like this notion of “solidarity,” entails “a freely chosen
relationship among free citizens” who both fınd and remain connected to
one another freely.69 Within this framework, members of a polity are thus
united by bonds of willfully adopted legal obligations and exemplify the
Ciceronian claim that “the best friend is also the best citizen.”70 Solidarity—
philia—is not Christian, but republican; it connects the compassionate and
empathetic ethic of brotherliness with the rule of law and the notion of
self-obligation to create a globally enabled regime of human rights.71
This formulation of political community allows for all kinds of conten-
tious discourse. Because of its reliance on solidarity, it demands that citizens
be willing to listen to the sufferings of others, a requirement John Durham
Peters understands as “central to the liberal project.”72 It is also consistent
with Allen’s understanding of friendship not as “an emotion, but a practice,
a set of hard-won, complicated habits that are used to bridge trouble,
diffıculty, and differences of personality, experience, and aspiration.”73
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“Friendship,” Allen noted, “is not easy, nor is democracy.”74 Again, a critic
interested in assessing the relationship between a specifıc discourse and the
nature of the political system it authorizes can look to the ways that dis-
course encourages or undermines a commitment to national solidarity
understood in this way.
We end with the concepts of solidarity and political community not
because we fınd in them realistic possibilities for organized political action.
Rather, we offer them as part of a propaedeutic set of considerations for
rhetorical critics. We see in them several ways of theorizing political dis-
course and its relationship to political community that, whatever their
shortcomings, are potentially richer andmore inclusive than the notions of
civility at the center of the post-Tucsondebate. It is to these concepts thatwe
should turn our scholarly attention.75
NOTES
1. Jeremy Engels, “Demophilia: A Discursive Counter to Demophobia in the Early
Republic,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 97 (2011): 131–54. See also Lawrence R. Jacobs,
Fay Lomax Cook, and Michael X. Delli Carpini, Talking Together: Public Deliberation
and Political Participation in America (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2009).
2. Susan Herbst, Rude Democracy: Civility and Incivility in American Politics
(Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 2010).
3. For analyses of news frames in terms of civility, see Catherine R. Squires, “Bursting the
Bubble: A Case Study of Counter-Framing in the Editorial Pages,” Critical Studies in
Media Communication 28 (2011): 30–49; and Kathleen Glenister Roberts, “‘Brand
America’: Media and the Framing of ‘Cosmopolitan’ Identities,” Critical Studies in
Media Communication 28 (2011): 68–84. For analyses of civility and the Internet, see
Kenneth Dautrich, David A. Yalof, and Mark Hugo López, The Future of the First
Amendment: The Digital Media, Civic Education, and Free Expression Rights in
America’s High Schools (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefıeld, 2008); and Henry A.
Giroux, “The Crisis of Public Values in the Age of the New Media,” Critical Studies in
Media Communication 28 (2011): 8–29.
4. See, for example, Martín Carcasson, “Facilitating Democracy through Passionate
Impartiality: Communication Studies Programs and Students Should Serve as Local
Resources,” Spectra, September 2011, 3–7; and P. M. Forni, “The Case for Formality,”
Spectra, September 2011, 8–10.
728 RHETORIC & PUBLIC AFFAIRS
This work originally appeared in Rhetoric & Public Affairs, 17.4, Winter 2014, published by Michigan State University Press.
5. See, for example, Murali Balaji, “Racializing Pity: The Haiti Earthquake and the Plight
of ‘Others,’” Critical Studies in Media Communication 28 (2011): 50–67.
6. The requirement of “good faith” is not without controversy in the rhetorical tradition.
Compare, for instance, Karl R. Wallace’s insistence on authenticity in public discourse
in “An Ethical Basis of Communication,” Speech Teacher 4 (1955): 1–9 with Thomas O.
Sloane’s equally strong statement about the negative effects of this concern in
“Reinventing Inventio,” College English 51 (1989): 461–73.
7. Wilson Carey McWilliams, Redeeming Democracy in America, ed. Patrick J. Deneen
and Susan J. McWilliams (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2011), 9. For an
extended discussion of “civic dignity” as an “intermediate stage” between “the Kantian
conception of dignity as intrinsic ‘worth beyond price’ (universal human dignity) and
an older conception of dignity as high standing ( . . . meritocratic dignity)” that
emphasizes “equal high standing among citizens” in a democracy, see Josiah Ober,
“Three Kinds of Dignity,” Athens Dialogues E-Journal (2012), http://
athensdialogues.chs.harvard.edu/cgi-bin/WebObjects/athensdialogues.woa/wa/
dist?dis22 (accessed February 18, 2014).
8. McWilliams, Redeeming Democracy in America, 27.
9. See, most obviously, Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. J. C. A. Gaskin (1651; rpt., New
York: Oxford University Press, 2009); and John Locke, Second Treatise of Civil
Government (1689; rpt., New York: Editorium, 2009). For an example of how the
creation of political community based on self-interest was translated into American
politics, see Alexis de Tocqueville on “self-interest properly understood” in Democracy
in America, ed. J. P. Mayer, trans. George Lawrence (1835–1840; rpt., New York:
Doubleday, 1969), 509–11.
10. Walt Whitman, “Democratic Vistas,” http://xroads.virginia.edu/hyper/whitman/
vistas/vistas.html (accessed February 18, 2014).
11. For a discussion of this point, see Richard Graff and Wendy Winn, “Presencing
‘Communion’ in Chaïm Perelman’s New Rhetoric,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 39 (2006):
45–71.
12. Graff and Winn, “Presencing ‘Communion,’” 62.
13. For a good discussion of this point, see David Boromisza-Habashi, Speaking Hatefully:
Culture, Communication, and Political Action in Hungary (University Park:
Pennsylvania State University Press, 2013).
14. The “rhetoric of politeness” might be compared and contrasted, in the extreme, with
Ciceronian adversarial rhetoric. Sean Patrick O’Rourke has begun to explore the
imbrication of these two impulses in Enlightenment theories of rhetoric; see his
CIVILITY, DEMOCRACY, AND NATIONAL POLITICS 729
This work originally appeared in Rhetoric & Public Affairs, 17.4, Winter 2014, published by Michigan State University Press.
“Sentimental Journey: The Place and Status of the Emotions in Hugh Blair’s Rhetoric,”
Advances in the History of Rhetoric 5 (2002): 21–36.
15. For all references in this essay to the president’s Tucson memorial address, we rely on
Barack Obama, “Remarks at a Memorial Service for Victims of the Shootings in
Tucson, Arizona,” January 12, 2011, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid88893
(accessed February 18, 2014). For the offıcial White House version of the speech, see
Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President at a Memorial Service for the Victims of the
Shooting in Tucson, Arizona,” The White House Offıce of the Press Secretary, January
12, 2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-offıce/2011/01/12/remarks-president-
barack-obama-memorial-service-victims-shooting-tucson (accessed February 18, 2014).
As will become clear, our reading differs considerably from that of our colleague David
A. Frank, whose essay in this volume (“Facing Moloch: Barack Obama’s National
Eulogies and Gun Violence”) takes issue with several of Obama’s rhetorical choices.
Our reading rides a narrower gauge, focused as it is on the question of civility, but see
the sources in note 16 for others who read the text in a more positive light.
16. It is perhaps notable that he received considerable plaudits for this speech, from both
the Left and the Right. See David Brooks, “The Missing Roots of Civility,” International
Herald Tribune, January 15, 2011, 8; Richard Wolf, “President’s Call for Civility Seen as
Striking Right Tone,” USA Today, January 14, 2011, SA; and Clifford Orwin, “A
Lincoln without a Gettysburg: Obama Speaks at Tucson,” Globe and Mail, January 14,
2011, A14. For a general survey of conservatives’ positive responses to the speech, see
Sahil Kapur, “Conservatives Praise Obama’s Speech on Tucson Shootings,” The Raw
Story, January 13, 2011, http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2011/01/13/conservatives-praise-
obamas-speech-tucson-shootings/ (accessed February 18, 2014).
17. For a useful discussion of various kinds of argumentation and their relationships to
civic cultures, see Patricia Roberts-Miller, Deliberate Conflict: Argument, Political
Theory, and Composition Classes (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press,
2004). The association of “civility as manners” with “classical liberalism” can be
misleading. The early American republic inherited its version of classical liberalism
from the United Kingdom and especially the theorists of the Scottish
Enlightenment, who embraced two somewhat contradictory strands of political
and rhetorical theory: Ciceronian civic republicanism with its controversial or
adversarial rhetoric (discussed in the next section of this paper) and the polite
ideology and conversational rhetoric of the early modern period. As Adam Potkay
pointed out some time ago, eighteenth-century Britain and in particular
eighteenth-century Scotland inherited what J. G. A. Pocock had earlier identifıed as
the ideal of politeness. Pocock wrote, “Politeness and enlightenment were irenic,
730 RHETORIC & PUBLIC AFFAIRS
This work originally appeared in Rhetoric & Public Affairs, 17.4, Winter 2014, published by Michigan State University Press.
established, and oligarchic ideals, capable of being employed against Puritan, Tory,
and republican alike and of making them look curiously similar.” As Court and
Country (the old British rivals who defıned the government and the opposition in
the early part of the eighteenth century) slowly united as a ruling class, they
together stood shoulder to shoulder, under the banner of politeness, against a vocal
democratic mob. See, generally, Adam Potkay, The Fate of Eloquence in the Age of
Hume (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994); and, more particularly, J. G. A.
Pocock, Virtue, Commerce, and History: Essays on Political Thought and History,
Chiefly in the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985),
236. On the movement of Court and Country against democracy, see especially
W. A. Speck, Stability and Strife: England, 1714–1760 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1977), 143–66.
18. See, for example, the story by Liz Marlantes, covering something called the “civility
movement”: “After the Arizona Shooting, the Civility Movement Sees Tipping Point,”
Christian Science Monitor, January 13, 2011, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2011/
0113/After-the-Arizona-shooting-the-civility-movement-sees-tipping-point (accessed
February 18, 2014).
19. Hence the focus in so many rhetorics of the Scottish Enlightenment, the defıning era of
classical liberalism, on what Douglas Wagner Ehninger years ago labeled “managerial
rhetoric.” See his “Selected Theories of Inventio in English Rhetoric, 1759–1828” (Ph.D.
diss., Ohio State University, 1949); and “George Campbell and the Revolution in
Inventional Theory,” Southern Speech Journal 15 (1950): 270–76. See also Barbara
Warnick, The Sixth Canon: Belletristic Rhetorical Theory and Its French Antecedents
(Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1993).
20. Perhaps the best discussion of this “conversable world” is David Hume’s “Of Essay
Writing,” in Of the Standard of Taste and Other Essays, ed. John W. Lenz (Indianapolis,
IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), 38–42. For a more contemporary understanding of Hume’s
essay, see Nancy S. Struever, “The Conversable World: Eighteenth-Century
Transformations of the Relation of Rhetoric and Truth,” in Rhetoric and the Pursuit of
Truth: Language Change in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries; Papers Read at a
Clark Library Seminar, 8 March 1980, ed. Brian Vickers and Nancy S. Struever (Los
Angeles: William Andrews Clark Memorial Library, University of California Press,
1985), 77–119.
21. The attribution of such shootings to the climate of discourse rather than to other
causes, such as school bullying, the lack of adequate gun control laws, or insuffıcient
mental health care, is a distinctive element of this event.
CIVILITY, DEMOCRACY, AND NATIONAL POLITICS 731
This work originally appeared in Rhetoric & Public Affairs, 17.4, Winter 2014, published by Michigan State University Press.
22. Thane Burnett, “The Rush to Point Fingers,” Toronto Sun, January 9, 2011, http://www.
torontosun.com/news/columnists/thane_burnett/2011/01/09/16818591.html (accessed Feb-
ruary 18, 2014).
23. Jason Horowitz and Lisa DeMoraes, “After Tragedy, Toxic Talk in the Media Cross
Hairs,”Washington Post, January 10, 2011, C9.
24. Horowitz and DeMoraes, “After Tragedy,” C9.
25. With one glaring exception, however, this theory of persuasive discourse and human
action has been repeatedly rejected by U.S. courts in First Amendment cases. See, for
example, Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 US 444 (1969); and Ron Manuto and Sean Patrick
O’Rourke, “Dancing with Wolves: Nudity, Morality, and the Speech/Conduct
Doctrine,” Free Speech Yearbook 32 (1994): 86–109. The exception is the so-called
“fıghting words doctrine” found in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 US 568 (1942).
Chaplinsky is in keeping with the earliest “clear and present danger” cases that
culminate, as Manuto and O’Rourke document, in a repudiation of that doctrine in
Brandenburg. It may be argued that the courts’ use of the “reasonable person” standard
is asking too much, or that our assumption that adults in a democracy should be able
to examine such discourse with something beyond the behaviorist’s response to stimuli
ignores the effects of such discourse on the mentally ill (see, for example, Francesca
Marie Smith and Thomas A. Hollihan, “‘Out of Chaos Breathes Creation’: Human
Agency, Mental Illness, and Conservative Arguments Locating Responsibility for the
Tucson Massacre,” in this volume). Still, the alternatives under the First Amendment
seem even less attractive.
26. Burnett, “Rush to Point Fingers,” 4.
27. For a rare example of this kind of coverage, see Rosalind S. Helderman and Anita
Kumar, “In Va. Assembly, a Call for Respect,”Washington Post, January 13, 2011,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/12/
AR2011011205933.html (accessed February 18, 2014).
28. Sheldon Alberts, “Tone Down Rhetoric, Obama Says; President Salutes Shooting
Victims at Memorial Service,” National Post, January 13, 2011. See also Editorial,
Toronto Star, January 15, 2011.
29. Burnett, “Rush to Point Fingers,” 4. See also Peter Wallsten, “An Ill-Tempered Debate
about Vitriol’s Role,”Washington Post, January 11, 2011, A1.
30. See, for example, Stephen Dinan, “Shooting from Hip Followed Rampage; Calls for
Civility after Arizona Killings Unheeded amid Finger-Pointing,”Washington Times,
January 11, 2011, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/jan/10/shooting-from-
hip-followed-rampage/ (accessed February 18, 2014).
31. Wallsten, “Ill-Tempered Debate,” A1.
732 RHETORIC & PUBLIC AFFAIRS
This work originally appeared in Rhetoric & Public Affairs, 17.4, Winter 2014, published by Michigan State University Press.
32. See also David M. Herszenhorn, “After Attack, Focus in Washington on Civility and
Security,” New York Times, January 9, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/10/us/
politics/10capital.html (accessed February 18, 2014).
33. See, amongmany others, Sean Aday, Steven Livingston, andMaeve Hebert, “Embedding
the Truth: A Cross-Cultural Analysis of Objectivity and Television Coverage of the Iraq
War,”Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics 10 (2005): 3–21.
34. Horowitz and DeMoraes, “After Tragedy,” C9.
35. For other examples of the “blame the media” frame, see Aaron Sharockman, “Arizona
Shooting Prompts Questions about Civility in Politics, with a Focus on Florida,” St.
Petersburg Times, January 10, 2011, http://www.politifact.com/florida/statements/2011/
jan/10/debbie-wasserman-schultz/arizona-shooting-prompts-questions-about-civility-/
(accessed February 18, 2014); and Dan Balz, “In Caustic Political Atmosphere, a
Moment of Pause,”Washington Post, January 10, 2011, A9.
36. For quotations fromMartin J. Medhurst and Larry Sabato, see Burnett, “Rush to Point
Fingers”; Jamieson is cited in Dinan, “Shooting from Hip.”
37. We distinguish here between an approach that assumes we are all on the verge of mental
illness and an approach that seeks to consider issues of civility and public discourse when at
least some of us are, in fact, mentally ill and perhaps more susceptible to certain kinds of
suggestion. On this see, again, Smith andHollihan, “‘Out of Chaos.’”
38. “After Shooting Spree in Tucson, Time to Tone Down the Vitriol,” USA Today,
January 10, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/10/us/politics/10capital.html
(accessed February 18, 2014).
39. For a similar concern in the context of 1960s protest see, for example, Robert L. Scott and
Donald K. Smith, “The Rhetoric of Confrontation,”Quarterly Journal of Speech 55 (1969):
1–8.
40. See Gloria Anzaldúa, Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza (San Francisco, CA:
Aunt Lute Books, 1987); bell hooks, Talking Back: Thinking Feminist, Thinking Black
(Boston, MA: South End Press, 1989); and Gail Bederman,Manliness and Civilization:
A Cultural History of Gender and Race in the United States, 1880–1917 (Chicago, IL:
University of Chicago Press, 1995).
41. Roberts-Miller, Deliberate Conflict, 153–54.
42. See Sonja K. Foss and Cindy L. Griffın, “Beyond Persuasion: A Proposal for an
Invitational Rhetoric,” Communication Monographs 62 (1995): 2–18; additionally, for a
reply to their critics, see Jennifer Emerling Bone, Cindy L. Griffın, and T. M. Linda
Scholz, “Beyond Traditional Conceptualizations of Rhetoric: Invitational Rhetoric and
a Move toward Civility,”Western Journal of Communication 72 (2008): 434–62.
Grounded in liberal humanism, invitational rhetoric assumes common ground
CIVILITY, DEMOCRACY, AND NATIONAL POLITICS 733
This work originally appeared in Rhetoric & Public Affairs, 17.4, Winter 2014, published by Michigan State University Press.
between interlocutors and tends to overlook inequities in power relations; for this
critique, see Nina M. Lozano-Reich and Dana L. Cloud, “The Uncivil Tongue:
Invitational Rhetoric and the Problem of Inequality,”Western Journal of
Communication 73 (2009): 220–26.
43. Changing the culture was, of course, a common theme throughout his 2008 campaign.
In a debate with Hillary Clinton, for instance, Obama said, “What our campaign has
been about is offering some specifıc solutions to how we move these issues forward and
identifying the need to change the culture in Washington, which we haven’t talked at
all about, but that has blocked real reform decade after decade after decade. That, I
think, is the job of the next president of the United States. That’s what I intend to do.
That’s why I’m running.” Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama, “Democratic Presidential
Candidates Debate in Philadelphia” (April 16, 2008); we have used the transcript
available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid76913 (accessed
February 18, 2014).
44. On rhetoric and political friendship, see, generally, Danielle S. Allen, Talking to
Strangers: Anxieties of Citizenship since Brown v. Board of Education (Chicago, IL:
University of Chicago Press, 2006).
45. “Controversial rhetoric” is a more or less Ciceronian system of eloquence designed for
the contentious world of public persuasion. Controversial rhetoric deploys a wide
range of practical precepts designed to assist advocates, like lawyers, who argue in a
fıeld of epistemological uncertainty and doubt. Indeed, Tom Sloane has observed that
for Cicero, judicial rhetoric was paradigmatic of the whole. Cicero therefore
consciously adopted an essentially legal theory of rhetoric, one based in the
give-and-take of forensic discourse and the struggle to develop moral and legal
arguments and strategies. In short, he refıned the traditional notion of debating both
sides of the question into a fundamentally rhetorical way of thinking. Recent
scholarship has dubbed this “controversial” thinking: the ability, or indeed the habit, of
disputation in utramque partem (on each part or each side of an issue). Controversial
rhetoric, then, is a way of approaching the world, a rhetorical stance predicated on the
assumption that doubt begets possibilities for argument and that—and this is
important—argument opens deliberation to a vast constellation of options,
considerations, and more possibilities. Its basic movement is agonistic: assertion and
denial, accusation and defense. It concerns itself with matters of justice, is directed
toward the public good, and is enacted in a public forum. See Thomas O. Sloane, On
the Contrary: The Protocol of Traditional Rhetoric (Washington, DC: Catholic
University of America Press, 1997).
734 RHETORIC & PUBLIC AFFAIRS
This work originally appeared in Rhetoric & Public Affairs, 17.4, Winter 2014, published by Michigan State University Press.
46. James L. Kastely, Rethinking the Rhetorical Tradition: From Plato to Postmodernism
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997), 240, quoted in Roberts-Miller,
Deliberate Conflict, 127. See also Catherine Helen Palczewski, “Argument in an Off
Key: Playing with the Productive Limits of Argument,” in Arguing Communication and
Culture: Selected Papers from the Twelfth NCA/AFA Conference on Argumentation, ed.
G. Thomas Goodnight (Washington, DC: National Communication Association,
2002), 1–23.
47. On the signifıcance of this shift, see Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives (1945; rpt.,
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), 3–15. Citation is to the California
edition.
48. Mary E. Stuckey, Slipping the Surly Bonds: Reagan’s Challenger Address (College
Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2006), 22.
49. See note 43 above.
50. Thomas W. Benson, “The Rhetoric of Civility: Power, Authenticity, and Democracy,”
Journal of Contemporary Rhetoric 1 (2011): 22–30, http://contemporaryrhetoric.com/
articles/benson1_3.pdf (accessed February 18, 2014).
51. Jeffrey B. Kurtz, “Civility, American Style,” Relevant Rhetoric 3 (2012): 3, http://
relevantrhetoric.com/wp-content/uploads/Civility-American-Style.pdf (accessed
February 18, 2014).
52. Dana L. Cloud, “The Violence of Civility” (paper presented at the Symbolic
Violence Conference, College Station, TX, March 1–4, 2012), 1. We are grateful to
Professor Cloud for graciously granting us access to a work-in-progress version of
her paper.
53. Cloud, “Violence of Civility,” 17.
54. Cloud, “Violence of Civility.”
55. For another study of the situational inappropriateness of civility, see M. J. Braun,
“Against Decorous Civility: Acting as if You Live in a Democracy,” in Activism and
Rhetoric: Theories and Contexts for Political Engagement, ed. Seth Kahn and Jonghwa
Lee (New York: Routledge, 2011), 137–46.
56. James Boyd White, Heracles’ Bow: Essays on the Rhetoric and Poetics of the Law
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989), 5.
57. Scott Welsh, The Rhetorical Surface of Democracy: How Deliberative Ideals Undermine
Democratic Politics (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2012), 111.
58. White, Heracles’ Bow, 15.
59. White, Heracles’ Bow, 23.
60. See Donald W. Shriver Jr., An Ethic for Enemies: Forgiveness in Politics (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1995), 9.
CIVILITY, DEMOCRACY, AND NATIONAL POLITICS 735
This work originally appeared in Rhetoric & Public Affairs, 17.4, Winter 2014, published by Michigan State University Press.
61. See Chantal Mouffe, On the Political (New York: Routledge, 2005). See also Amy
Gutmann and Dennis Thompson,Why Deliberative Democracy? (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2004).
62. For a similar vision see, for example, Michelle Bachelor Robinson, “21st Century
Civility in the Wake of the Obama Presidency: A New Perspective—the Same Old
Story,” Alabama Humanities Review, March 31, 2011, http://
alahumanitiesreview.wordpress.com/2011/03/31/%E2%80%9C21st-century-civility-in-
the-wake-of-the-obama-presidency-a-new-perspective%E2%80%94the-same-old-
story%E2%80%9D/ (accessed February 18, 2014).
63. Allen, Talking to Strangers, 63.
64. Allen, Talking to Strangers, 136.
65. Allen, Talking to Strangers, 136.
66. See, for example, Thomas Conley, Toward a Rhetoric of Insult (Chicago, IL: University
of Chicago Press, 2010).
67. Whitman, “Democratic Vistas.”
68. Hauke Brunkhorst, Solidarity: From Civic Friendship to a Global Legal Community,
trans. Jeffrey Flynn (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005).
69. Brunkhorst, Solidarity, 12.
70. Brunkhorst, Solidarity, 14.
71. Brunkhorst, Solidarity, 70–74, 149–59.
72. John Durham Peters, Courting the Abyss: Free Speech and the Liberal Tradition
(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 217. But Peters also falls victim to the
lure of polite ideology and the notion that a full and robust public debate need not
venture into the “abyss” of the obscene, the offensive, or the deranged. On this point,
see Sean Patrick O’Rourke and Ron Manuto, “Embracing the Abyss: Response to John
Durham Peters’ Courting the Abyss,” Free Speech Yearbook 44 (2009): 177–86.
73. Allen, Talking to Strangers, xxi.
74. Allen, Talking to Strangers, xxi.
75. Certainly, we would fınd this effort more useful than the establishment of “civility
institutes” such as the one formed by the University of Arizona and chaired by George
H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton in the aftermath of the Tucson shooting. For more about
the founding of the University of Arizona center, see Bernie Becker, “Clinton, Elder
Bush Honorary Chairs of Arizona Civility Center,” Briefıng Room, The Hill, February
21, 2011, http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefıng-room/news/145387-clinton-elder-bush-
honorary-chairs-of-arizona-civility-center (accessed February 18, 2014).
736 RHETORIC & PUBLIC AFFAIRS
This work originally appeared in Rhetoric & Public Affairs, 17.4, Winter 2014, published by Michigan State University Press.
